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FEATURE COMMENT: Trump Executive
Order Calls For More Aggressive Use Of
The Buy American Act—An Order Likely
To Have More Political Than Practical
Effect
President Trump recently issued an executive order,
EO 13881, 84 Fed. Reg. 34257 (July 15, 2019), calling
for more aggressive application of the Buy American
Act. The new order calls for the Federal Acquisition
Regulatory Council to strengthen domestic preferences under the Act. The order was long predicted
as another step in the Trump administration’s advancing protectionism. Indeed, most of the Trump
administration’s protectionist initiatives have been
foreseeable from the outset, for the Trump administration has consistently embraced those initiatives
that provide maximum political benefit at minimum
cost. But developments since Trump took office—including new data that show that the Buy American
Act applies to a markedly small portion of federal
procurement, and emerging electronic marketplaces
that could swallow up much of that small market
share—may mean the new executive order has far
more impact politically (both in the U.S. and abroad)
than it does practically.
The Executive Order on Revamping the
“Buy American” Regulations—Trump’s most
recent executive order, see 61 GC ¶ 217, followed
an April 2017 executive order (EO 13788), which
called for executive agencies to “Buy American” when
possible, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 21, 2017); 59 GC
¶ 115, and a Jan. 31, 2019 order (EO 13858), which
directed agencies to encourage grantees to purchase
U.S.-made goods in federally funded initiatives, such
4-215-508-2
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as infrastructure projects, 84 Fed. Reg. 2029 (Jan. 31,
2019). See Grier, “President’s Buy American Order:
Raise Domestic Content” (July 22, 2019), trade.djaghe.com/?p=5921.
On its face, the latest executive order seems to
have more bite. The order notes that it “is the policy
of the United States to buy American and to maximize ... the use of goods ... produced in the United
States,” and that as a result the Trump administration “shall enforce the Buy American Act to the
greatest extent permitted by law.”
To maximize the impact of the Buy American
Act, the new order calls for the Federal Acquisition
Regulatory Council to revamp the Buy American
Act’s implementing regulations. Those complex
regulations are set forth at Federal Acquisition
Regulation subpts. 25.1 (for supplies) and 25.2 (for
construction materials), 48 CFR subpts. 25.1 & 25.2.
The current regulations (summarized here for brevity) ask two questions to qualify an item as domestic:
was the item manufactured in the U.S. , and does
it contain the requisite U.S. domestic content. E.g.,
FAR 25.001(c)(1). If the item is determined to be of
foreign origin, the regulations apply a price preference (not a bar) to favor competing U.S.-origin items.
See, e.g., Bashur, Stewart and Weinkam, “Current
Challenges Facing Contractors Under Recent Changes to Domestic Preference Programs,” Procurement
Law., Winter 2018, at 3, 4.
Trump’s new order calls for regulators to expand
the domestic content requirements under the Act,
largely by rewriting the regulatory scheme launched
by President Eisenhower’s order that has, for over 60
years, guided enforcement under the Buy American
Act, Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain Determinations Under the Buy American Act, EO 10582,
19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (Dec. 17, 1954). See generally Nibley, Conant and Bakkies, Feature Comment, “Real
Steps Towards ‘Buy American’ Compliance—Part I:
Unpacking FAR Pt. 25 and the Application of ‘Buy
American’ Laws,” 60 GC ¶ 52.
Under that existing regulatory scheme for
Buy American Act enforcement, covered goods,
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Proposed Changes to Domestic Content
Requirements—What Percent Content Makes
an Item “Foreign” Under the Buy American Act
Iron and Steel
Items

Other Items

Existing
Law

50%

50%

Trump
Proposal

5% foreign iron
or steel

45% foreign content
(could decrease to 25%)

If an item qualifies as “foreign” under the Buy
American Act test, the next step is to assess the price
preference. See Green, International Government
Contract Law § 2.4 (Westlaw Nov. 2018). In simplified
terms, a domestic item offered by a small business is
afforded a 12-percent price preference, i.e., award may
be made to the U.S. item even if it is up to 12 percent
more expensive, FAR 25.105(b); domestic items offered by other businesses enjoy a six-percent preference, id.; and domestic items offered to the Defense
Department enjoy a 50-percent preference, Defense
FAR Supplement 252.225-7001. (The 50-percent preference for Defense Department items is almost never
seen in practice, perhaps because so much defense
materiel is covered by reciprocal defense procurement
agreements between the U.S. and its allies, and those
agreements remove most barriers to defense trade.
See generally Miller, “Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal
Defense Procurement Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 93 (2009).)
2

The new Trump order would radically expand
these Buy American price preferences (though not the
preference for Defense Department purchases).Under
the regulations called for by the order, domestic items
from small businesses would enjoy a 30-percent price
preference, and those from other businesses would
have a 20-percent price preference.
Price Preferences Applied Against Foreign
Items Under Buy American Act
Small Businesses

Other Businesses

Existing
Law

12% price
preference

6% price
preference

Trump
Proposal

30% price
preference

20% price
preference

What the Order Does Not Address—President
Trump’s executive order calls for the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council to publish a proposed rule
for public comment. The order leaves unaddressed a
number of exceptions and safe harbors under the Buy
American Act, see, e.g., Buy American Act: Actions
Needed to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting
and Selected Agency Guidance (GAO-19-17), at 4–9,
www.gao.gov/assets/700/696086.pdf, which may
complicate the rulemaking and severely limit the
impact of the new executive order. Those include:
• The Buy American exception for commercially
available off-the-shelf (COTS) items: Under
current regulations, COTS items manufactured in the United States need not contain
a requisite level of domestic content. See 41
USCA § 1907 (exceptions for COTS items); FAR
25.001(c); see also Green, supra, § 2.8 (discussing legal test for “manufacture”). Nothing in
the order suggests that this exception will be
eliminated; leaving it in place, however, will
limit the new order’s impact.

“Squeezing” the Buy
American Act

even if manufactured in the U.S., must include at
least 50 percent U.S. content. See, e.g., FAR 25.003
(“ ‘Domestic end product’ means ... [a]n end product
manufactured in the United States, if ... [t]he cost of
its components mined, produced, or manufactured
in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost
of all its components.”). The new order from President Trump would decrease the foreign content
allowed to only five percent for iron and steel end
products, and to 45 percent for all other end products. (The order also calls for senior trade officials
to assess whether the 45-percent limit could, in
time, be reduced to 25 percent.) Thus, for example,
if an iron end product included foreign iron that
constituted more than five percent of the cost of all
the components used in the end product, that end
product would be considered of foreign origin under
the recent executive order.

•

Acquisitions Above Trade Agreements
Thresholds (typically $180,000):
Buy American Act Does Not Apply
Buy American Act Applies: Acquisitions from $10,000 to the Trade Agreements Thresholds
Micro-Purchases (Currently up to
$10,000):
Buy American Act Does Not Apply

The exception for procurements above the trade
agreements thresholds: What is often over© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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looked is that the Buy American Act does not
apply to procurements above the thresholds
set in various international trade agreements;
those thresholds for supplies range from
$25,000 (for Canada) to $180,000 (under the
most important agreement, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)). See FAR 25.402.
Procurements above those thresholds are
exempt from the Buy American Act, pursuant
to waiver authority vested in the president
by the Trade Agreements Act. See, e.g., Grier,
“Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Broad Authority, Narrow Application” (Apr. 21, 2014), trade.
djaghe.com/?p=559; GAO-19-17, supra at 4. In
effect, these trade agreements “squeeze down”
on the Buy American Act, and limit its effect to
smaller contracts below the trade agreements
thresholds. Nothing in the new EO suggests
that those trade agreements will be undone. In
fact, as is discussed below, because of Canada’s
unexpected refusal to join the procurement
provisions in the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), it will be even more difficult
for the U.S. to abandon existing agreements.
For now (at least), the latticework of international trade agreements opening procurement
markets seems secure, and those agreements
leave only a limited scope to the Buy American
Act.
The safe harbor for goods sold through “catalogue” contracts: The international trade agreements typically contain a provision, see, e.g.,
WTO GPA, II.6, echoed in the FAR, see FAR
25.403, which says that agencies should look
to the total estimated value of the acquisition—not the value of an individual order—in
assessing whether a procurement exceeds
the trade agreements’ monetary thresholds
and thus is covered by a trade agreement. In
practice, this rule means that many catalogue
contracts (known as “indefinite-delivery/
indefinite-quantity” contracts in the U.S., and
“framework” agreements internationally) are
assumed to have total values larger than the
trade agreements’ monetary thresholds and so
are not covered by the Buy American Act.
The exception for acquisitions below the
micro-purchase threshold—fueled by the

© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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prospect of new commercial electronic marketplaces: While international trade agreements “squeeze” the Buy American Act from
above, micro-purchases erode it from below.
Micro-purchases are exempt from the Buy
American Act, see, e.g., Congressional Research Service, Domestic Content Restrictions:
The Buy American Act and Complementary
Provisions of Federal Law 7 (R43354, Sept.
12, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20160912_R43354_80f139d4eb763ccc
d9a433cba33e81d5567f6f5d.pdf. The scope
of micro-purchases in the Federal Government may grow dramatically in the coming
years, as users—ordinary federal employees,
not contracting officials—are allowed to use
online marketplaces (such as Amazon.com or
Walmart.com) to purchase goods and services
for the Federal Government. See generally
Yukins and Ramish, Feature Comment, “Section 809 and ‘E-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting
Bid Protests in Federal Procurement, Could
Breach International Agreements and Raise
New Risks of Corruption,” 60 GC ¶ 138, ssrn.
com/abstract=3176223. Under a mandate
from Congress, the General Services Administration has endorsed the use of electronic
marketplaces, see GSA, Procurement Through
Commercial E-Commerce Portals—Phase
II Report: Market Research & Consultation
(April 2019), interact.gsa.gov/document/
gsa-and-omb-phase-2-deliverable-attached,
and a draft solicitation No. 7QSCC19R0429
(available on www.fbo.gov) for electronic
marketplaces has been published for comment. That draft solicitation’s statement of
objectives makes it clear that GSA’s pilot
electronic marketplaces will be focused,
at least at first, on sales below the micropurchase threshold. Furthermore, while the
limit on micro-purchases is generally $10,000,
see OMB Memorandum M-18-18 (June 20,
2018), GSA has urged Congress to increase
the micro-purchase threshold to $25,000 for
purchases through GSA-approved electronic
marketplaces, see GSA, Procurement Through
Commercial E-Commerce Portals, supra, at 4.
If the micro-purchase cap does rise to $25,000,
it will be even easier for federal buyers to use
micro-purchases through commercial elec3
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GAO found that foreign products subject to the Buy
American Act came to under $8 billion—less than
two percent of annual federal procurement of roughly $500 billion

In part because of these various exceptions and
safe harbors, the Buy American Act in fact covers a
relatively small portion of the approximately $500
billion in annual federal procurement. A recent study
by the Government Accountability Office found that
foreign end products accounted for only $7.8 billion
of fiscal year 2017 obligations for products potentially
subject to the Buy American Act. GAO-19-17, supra,
at 11; GAO Finds Inconsistent Buy American Guidance, Inaccurate Procurement Data, 61 GC ¶ 2. That
very small sliver of the federal procurement budget
potentially touched by the Buy American Act—less
than two percent of annual federal procurement
spending of roughly $500 billion—may shrink even
further in the coming years, as firms work to take
advantage of the various exceptions and safe harbors
from an increasingly onerous Buy American Act.
These many variables will make it difficult for
regulators to assess the potential costs and benefits
of the proposed rule changes, including its impact on
commercial markets. Cf. Yukins and Cora, Feature
Comment, “Considering the Effects of Public Procurement Regulations on Competitive Markets,” 55 GC
¶ 64 (regulators should consider costs and benefits
when assessing rules with significant economic impact). Beyond the coverage issues outlined above, it will
be difficult to assess how stricter Buy American preferences may affect procurement outcomes. The price
preferences put in place under the Buy American Act
during the Eisenhower administration assumed that
procurement awards would be based solely on price.
That is no longer true in many federal procurements;
statistically, the vast majority of federal procurement
decisions are now based on “best value” competitive
assessments which weigh both price and quality. See,
e.g., Yukins, “The U.S. Federal Procurement System:
An Introduction,” 2017 Upphandlingsrattslig Tidskrift
(UrT) 69, 81–82, ssrn.com/abstract=3063559. In this
new world of “best value” procurement, mere price preferences—even the large price preferences for domestic
items contemplated by the most recent EO—may create a regulatory conundrum.
4

Conclusion—The New Executive Order
and the Trump Protectionist Agenda—As the
discussion above reflects, ultimately the new executive order may have relatively little practical effect
in increasing federal purchases of U.S.-origin goods.
Even if the order succeeded in sweeping all foreign
competition from the small share of the federal
market still potentially covered by the Buy American Act—roughly $8 billion—that would have little,
if any, real impact on the U.S. trade deficit, which
rose to $621 billion in 2018. The order’s purpose
therefore seems largely political, and as such it was
one of the predictable protectionist steps that the
Trump administration was likely to take.
In a paper presented in February 2017 to the
Thomson Reuters Government Contracts Year in
Review Conference, the author suggested that, by
assessing the various protectionist options open
to the Trump administration, and weighing their
perceived political benefits (in stirring the Trump
political base) against potential risks and costs, it
was possible to predict which protectionist measures the Trump administration would most likely
press in procurement. The following chart which
reflected those options in early 2017 has, for the
most part, proven remarkably prescient:
Trump Administration Options:
International Trade and Procurement
Ignore reciprocal
defense
agreements

Increasing risk/difficulty

tronic marketplaces to avoid the impact of the
Buy American Act.

Renegotiate
coverage under
trade
agreements

Publicly pressure
officials to “Buy
American”
Expand price
preference
under Buy
American Act
Stall China et al.
from joining
GPA

“Buy American”
requirement in
infrastructure
legislation

Increasing perceived benefits

See Yukins, “International Procurement Developments in 2016—Part I: The Trump Administration’s
Policy Options in International Procurement,” 2017
Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 3 (Feb. 2017).
As was explained above, the Trump administration
has largely followed this predicted path:
• Public Pressure to “Buy American”: As expected, Trump did indeed pressure U.S. officials to “Buy American” in April 2017. See
EO 13788.
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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“Buy American” in Infrastructure: Trump’s
prior EO 13858 called for executive agencies
to encourage grantees to “Buy American” when
using federal grants for infrastructure projects.
Major infrastructure legislation—which President Trump has touted as a trillion-dollar initiative—is stalled politically, but likely would
include a “Buy American” provision much like
Section 1605 of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, which called for the use of
U.S.-made iron, steel and manufactured items
in projects funded by that act.
No Action Against Defense Procurement Agreements: The Trump administration has not
moved to curb the reciprocal defense procurement agreements which open defense markets
with allies, perhaps because of the costs and
risk of disrupting sales of military materiel
abroad. Instead, the Trump administration has
urged more aggressive foreign military sales.
See, e.g., Cleary, “U.S. Arms Sales Overseas
Skyrocketed 33% in 2018,” Breaking Defense,
Oct. 9, 2018 (“The United States sold $55.6 billion worth of weapons to allies in fiscal 2018,
a massive 33 percent increase over 2017 as
the Trump administration has given the Pentagon and State Department a green light to
sell more, more quickly, overseas.”), available
at www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/
us-arms-sales-overseas-skyrocketed-33-2018.
China and the GPA: Any talk of China joining
the GPA seems to have been drowned out by
the broader—and intense—trade battles between the United States and China.
Renegotiating Trade Agreements: President
Trump issued EO 13796, 82 Fed. Reg. 20819
(May 4, 2017), which called for a general review
of trade agreements for fairness; the report on
that review has never been published, however.
The Trump administration also tried to reframe
international procurement agreements by
demanding dollar-for-dollar reciprocity in the
USMCA negotiations (a startling departure
from decades of U.S. trade practice), but was
rebuffed. Findings from a recent GAO report
suggested that it would be very difficult to administer dollar-for-dollar reciprocity (one dollar
of access to the U.S. federal procurement market
in return for one dollar of access to a trading
partner’s market), in part because the data on
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•

international trade in procurement remains so
uncertain. See Foreign Sourcing in Government
Procurement, at 2 (GAO-19-414, May 2019)
(“U.S. trade policy is being made and international procurement negotiations conducted
with limited empirical data available about
the country of origin of the goods and services
purchased”), www.gao.gov/assets/700/699393.
pdf. Moreover, during the USMCA negotiations,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pointed out that
strict reciprocity under the USMCA could in
practice cut existing U.S. access to Mexican public procurement markets because Mexican firms
sell so little to U.S. agencies. Canada, which
had publicly criticized the concept of strict
reciprocity, simply refused to join the USMCA’s
procurement chapter. See Yukins, “International
Procurement Developments in 2018 – Part IV:
The United States in International Procurement: Understanding a Pause in the Trump
Administration’s Protectionism,” 2019 Gov’t
Contracts Year in Review Briefs 6 (Feb. 2019)
(citing authorities). By refusing to join, Canada
may have “locked” the U.S. into the GPA, for if
Canada does not open its public markets under
the USMCA and the USMCA replaces the North
American Free Trade Agreement as planned,
the GPA—one of the most robust of the international agreements affecting procurement—
will be the sole agreement guaranteeing U.S.
exporters access to the Canadian markets. See
generally Government Procurement Agreements
Contain Similar Provisions, but Market Access
Commitments Vary (GAO-16-727, Sept. 2016)
(noting access afforded by GPA), www.gao.gov/
assets/690/680044.pdf.
Expanding Price Preferences Under the Buy
American Act: Finally, and as expected, Trump
has now called for an expansion of price preferences under the Buy American Act. See, e.g.,
Choi, “ ‘Buy American and Hire American’:
President Trump’s Options for Strengthening
the Buy American Act,” 47 Pub. Cont. L.J. 79,
85 (2017). Because of the various curbs on the
Buy American Act, discussed above, this latest
order probably will have no material impact
on the U.S. trade deficit, which in 2018 was
$621 billion—roughly 80 times larger than the
federal market potentially subject to the Buy
American Act. In sum, the practical impact
5
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of the latest EO is likely to be very limited
because the Buy American Act plays a very
small role in the modern federal procurement
market.
The political impact of the new EO is likely to
be much larger, both here and abroad. In the U.S.,
Trump’s political base probably will cheer this latest
round of economic nationalism, although the new
order can do little to restore the U.S. manufacturing
base—the touchstone for the Trump administration’s protectionist efforts. Abroad, those in Europe
and beyond who favor heightened protectionism may
well point to this latest “Buy American” initiative
as an excuse for new trade barriers in procurement.
Although the Buy American Act has grown far less
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relevant since it was passed in 1933, for foreigners it
is consistently a rallying point for protectionism—if
the Americans have a strong Buy American Act, the
argument goes, why shouldn’t we? The Trump administration’s latest protectionist measure will almost
certainly encourage new barriers to international
trade, and thus may cause new divisions in the community of nations.
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This Feature Comment was written for T he
Government Contractor by Professor Christopher
R. Yukins of the George Washington University
Law School in Washington, D.C.
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